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Introduction
The empirical literature has provided substantial evidence of investment irreversibilities at the
establishment level. Analyzing the behavior of a large number of manufacturing establishments over
time, Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger  cite: caballero engel haltiwanger  determined that
establishments are much more inclined to expanding their stock of capital than to reducing it. Ramey
and Shapiro  cite: ramey and shapiro  presented more direct evidence. Using data from the equipment
auction of an aerospace firm, they estimated the wedge between the purchase and resale price for
different types of capital. They found that machine tools sell at about 31% of their purchase value,
while structural equipment sell at only 5%. These estimates indicate surprisingly large levels of
irreversibilities in investment.
Since the early and influential paper by Arrow  cite: arrow  there has been substantial theoretical
microeconomic work on irreversible investment (see Dixit and Pindyck  cite: dixit and pindyck  for a
survey). A common result is that irreversibilities are extremely important for establishment level
dynamics. For example, Abel and Eberly  cite: abel and eberly  analyzed the problem of a firm facing a
resale price of capital which is lower than its purchase price. They showed that the optimal investment
decision of the firm is a two-triggers (S,s) policy, and characterized the associated range of inaction as
a function of the wedge between the purchase and resale price of capital. They found that even small
irreversibilities can have a large impact on the range of inaction, substantially affecting the investment
dynamics of the firm.
While the microeconomic consequences of investment irreversibilities are well understood, their
macroeconomic implications are not. To evaluate the importance of investment irreversibilities for
aggregate dynamics, this paper formulates and analyzes a real business cycle model of establishment
level dynamics. The basic framework is analogous to the neoclassical stochastic growth model with
indivisible labor analyzed by Hansen  cite: hansen  and for a particular parametrization the model
reduces to his. Output, which can be consumed or invested, is produced by a large number of
establishments that use capital and labor as inputs into a decreasing returns to scale production
technology. Establishments receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks that determine their expansion,
contraction or death. Establishments are also subject to an aggregate productivity shock which
generates aggregate fluctuations in the economy. For simplicity, both entry and exit are treated as
exogenous.
While labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile across establishments, capital is not. Once capital is
in place at an establishment there are costs associated with detaching and moving it. These costs imply
that a fraction of the productive services of capital are lost in the process of uninstalling it. This is
analogous to the case analyzed by Abel and Eberly  cite: abel and eberly , where the sale price of
capital is lower than its purchase price.
Computing the stochastic general equilibrium dynamics for this (S,s) economy is a challenging
task. The difficulty stems from carrying an endogenous distribution of heterogeneous agents as a state
variable (which is a highly dimensional object). This paper develops a computational strategy that
makes this class of problems fully tractable. The method involves keeping track of long histories of
(S,s) thresholds as state variables, instead of the current distribution of agents in the economy. The
convenience of this alternative state space is that standard linear-quadratic approximation techniques
can be directly applied. footnote 
To evaluate the importance of investment irreversibilities for macroeconomic dynamics, economies
with different degrees of irreversibilities are calibrated to U.S. data and their aggregate fluctuations
compared. The results are striking. Investment irreversibilities play no important role in aggregate
dynamics: economies ranging from fully reversible to completely irreversible investment generatealmost identical aggregate business cycle fluctuations. The only way in which investment
irreversibilities matter is for establishment level dynamics. In principle, investment irreversibilities
could affect aggregate business cycle fluctuations if aggregate productivity shocks were variable
enough, but this would require an implausibly large variability of measured solow residuals.
Previous work on the importance of microeconomic irreversibilities for macroeconomic dynamics
includes Bertola and Caballero  cite: bertola caballero 1990, bertola caballero 1994 , Caballero and
Engel  cite: caballero engel 2, caballero and engel , and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger
 cite: caballero engel haltiwanger . None of these studies performs an equilibrium analysis. In some
cases, the optimal decision rule of an individual establishment facing an ad-hoc stochastic process for
prices is derived; the behavior of a large number of such establishments then aggregated to study
aggregate investment dynamics. In other cases, no economic structure is used: even the investment
decision rules of establishments are directly assumed. On the contrary, this paper analyzes the general
equilibrium dynamics of an explicit economic environment. This is an important methodological
innovation. To fully capture the implications of microeconomic irreversibilities for macroeconomic
dynamics, a general equilibrium analysis is required.
In fact, the conclusions in this paper are dramatically different from those in the previous literature.
In a celebrated paper, Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger  cite: caballero engel haltiwanger  found that
non-linear adjustments at the establishment level substantially improve the ability of their aggregate
investment equation to keep track of U.S. aggregate investment behavior, specially when aggregate
investment is far from its mean. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger interpreted this result as evidence
that investment irreversibilities have important implications for macroeconomic dynamics. In
particular, that irreversibilities are crucial in generating brisk expansions and contractions in aggregate
investment. Since this has become the dominant view thereafter, this paper will devote considerable
attention to contrasting both methods of analysis. It will be argued that the
Caballero-Engel-Haltiwanger approach presents a serious limitation: it assumes that important features
of investment decisions are invariant to the adjustment costs that establishments face. As a
consequence, it can lead to the wrong answers. In fact, this paper shows that when the CEH method is
applied to our model economy, their same conclusions are obtained. But when the analysis is restricted
to investment behavior which is fully consistent with the economic environment that establishments
face, microeconomic irreversibilities have no effects on aggregate dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economy, Section 3 discusses the
computational method, Section 4 parametrizes the model, Section 5 describes the business cycles of a
benchmark economy, Section 6 discusses the importance of investment irreversibilities for business
cycle fluctuations, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
The model economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical agents with names in the unit




> Kt￿log￿ct￿ + v￿lt￿￿     
where ct and lt are consumption and leisure respectively, and 0 < K < 1 is the subjective time discount
factor. Every period agents receive a time endowment equal to g. Following Rogerson  cite: rogerson 
and Hansen  cite: hansen , it is assumed that there is an institutionally determined workweek of fixed
length which is normalized to one, so leisure can only take values g or g-1.
Output, which can be consumed or invested, is produced by a large number of establishments.
Each establishment uses capital (k) and labor (n) as inputs into a production technology given by:yt = eztstkt
Snt
L     
where S + L < 1, st is an idiosyncratic productivity shock and zt is an aggregate productivity shock
common to all establishments. Realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shock st take values in the
set Æ0,1,V￿ and are independent across establishments. Over time, st follows a first order Markov
process with transition matrix E, where ^￿s,sv￿ is the probability that st+1 = sv conditional on st = s.
This process is assumed to be such that: 1) starting from any initial value, with probability one st
reaches zero in finite time, and 2) once st reaches zero, there is zero probability that st will receive a
positive value in the future. Given these assumptions, it is natural to identify a zero value for the
productivity shock with the death of an establishment. footnote  The aggregate productivity shock zt
follows a law of motion given by:
zt+1 = _zt + Pt+1     
where 0 < _ < 1, and Pt is i.i.d. with variance aP
2 and zero mean.
Labor is perfectly mobile in this economy, but capital is not. On one hand, the amount of capital
kt+1 in place at an establishment at date t + 1 must be decided at period t before the realization of st+1
becomes known. On the other hand, investment is partially irreversible: whenever capital is detached
from the floor of an establishment it loses a fraction ￿1 ? q￿ of its remaining productive services. To be
precise, let 0 < N < 1 be the depreciation rate of capital. In order to increase an establishment’s next
period stock of capital kt+1 above its current level net of depreciation ￿1 ? N￿kt, an investment of
kt+1 ? ￿1 ? N￿kt units is needed. On the contrary, when an establishment decreases its next period stock
of capital kt+1 below its current level net of depreciation ￿1 ? N￿kt, the amount of investment goods
obtained is only a fraction q of ￿1 ? N￿kt ? kt+1. The parameter q is a measure of the degree of the
investment irreversibilities in the economy and will play a crucial role in the analysis.
Every period, agents receive an endowment of new establishments which arrive with zero initial
capital in place. Initial values for s across new establishments are distributed according to f. This
exogenous birth of new establishments compensates the ongoing death of existing establishments (as
they get absorbed into zero productivity) and results in a constant long run number of
establishments. footnote 
The presence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks and irreversible investment at the establishment
level suggests indexing establishments according to their current productivity shocks s and current
stock of capital k. In what follows, a measure xt over current productivity shocks and capital levels will
describe the number of establishments of each type at period t. footnote  Also, a measurable function
nt will describe the number of workers across establishment types, a measurable function gt+1 will
describe the next period stock of capital across establishment types, and Rt will denote the fraction of
the population that works.
Feasibility constraints consumption as follows:
ct † XÆ ezts kSnt￿k,s￿
L ? ￿gt+1￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ Q￿gt+1￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿￿dxt
+ X￿1 ? N￿ gt￿k,s￿ q ^￿s,0￿ dxt?1     
where Q￿ ￿ is an indicator function that takes value 1 if its argument is positive, and value q (the
irreversibility parameter) otherwise. The first term, is the sum of output minus investment across all
types of establishments, taking into account the capital losses due to the investment irreversibilities.
The second term on the right hand side corresponds to all those establishments that were in operation
the previous period and die during the current period (transit to an idiosyncratic shock equal to 0),
getting to sell a fraction q of their stock of capital gt￿k,s￿ net of depreciation.
Similarly, the total number of workers at establishments is constrained not to exceed the fraction of
the population that works Rt:Xnt￿k,s￿ dxt † Rt     
Finally, the law of motion for the measure xt must be consistent with the capital decisions at the
plant level. That is, for every Borel set B:
xt+1￿B,sv￿ =
￿k,s￿: gt+1￿k,s￿5B
X ^￿s,sv￿ dxt + c f￿sv￿ e￿0 5 B￿     
where e￿ ￿ is an indicator function that takes value 1 if its argument is true, and zero otherwise. In
words, the number of establishments that next period have a stock of capital in the set B and a
productivity shock sv, is given by the sum of two terms: 1) all those establishments that transit from
their current shocks to the shock sv and choose a next period stock of capital in the set B, and 2) in the
case that 0 5 B, all new establishments that arrive with an initial productivity shock sv (note that new
establishments are born with a zero initial stock of capital).
Following Hansen  cite: hansen  and Rogerson  cite: rogerson , agents are assumed to trade
employment lotteries. These are contracts that specify probabilities of working, and allow agents to
perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic risk they face. Since agents are ex-ante identical, they all chose the




> Kt logct ? J Rt     
where J = v￿g￿ ? v￿g ? 1￿ (see Hansen  cite: hansen  and Rogerson  cite: rogerson  for details ). Since
this is a convex economy with no externalities nor other distortions the competitive equilibrium
allocation can be solved by analyzing the Social Planner’s problem with equal weights, which is given
by maximizing ( ref: preferences ) subject to ( ref: aggregate shocks ), ( ref: feasible consumption ),
( ref: feasible labor ), and ( ref: main motion x ).
Computation
This section describes the computational approach. The method is novel and constitutes an
important contribution of this paper. However, readers less interested in computational methods and
more interested in substantive results can proceed directly to Section 4 with no loss of continuity.
The state of the economy is given by the current aggregate productivity shock z, the current
measure x across establishment types, the previous period measure y across establishment types, and
the previous period investment decisions d (zt, xt, xt?1 and gt respectively in terms of the previous
section notation). footnote  The Social Planner’s Problem can then be described by the following
Bellman equation:
V￿d,x,y,z￿ = MAX lnc ? J R + K E V￿dv,xv,yv,zv￿     
subject to
c † XÆ ezs kSn￿k,s￿
L ? ￿g￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ Q￿g￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ ￿dx
+ X￿1 ? N￿ d￿k,s￿ q ^￿s,0￿ dy     
Xn￿k,s￿ dx † R     
xv￿B,sv￿ =
￿k,s￿: g￿k,s￿5B
X ^￿s,sv￿ dx + c f￿sv￿ e￿0 5 B￿     
dv = g     yv = x     
zv = _z + Pv     
where the maximization is over n￿ ￿ and g￿ ￿. Note the high dimensionality of the state space which
seems to preclude any possibilities of computing a solution. footnote  Below, I will show that this
difficulty is only apparent: the problem becomes fully tractable once it is redefined in terms of a
convenient set of variables.
To understand the rationale for the transformed problem, it will be convenient to analyze the
structure of the problem that establishments face at the competitive equilibrium. The individual state of
an establishment is given by its current productivity shock s and its current stock of capital k. The
problem of an establishment with individual state ￿k,s￿ when the aggregate state is ￿d,x,y,z￿ is given
by:
J￿k,s;d,x,y,z￿ = MAX Æ ezs kSnL ? w￿d,x,y,z￿n ? ￿kv ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿Q￿kv ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿
+ E￿i￿d,x,y,z;dv,xv,yv,zv￿J￿kv,sv;dv,xv,yv,zv￿￿     
subject to:
sv i E￿s￿     
zv = _z + Pv     
￿dv,xv,yv￿ = H￿d,x,y,z￿     
where w￿ ￿ is the equilibrium wage rate, i￿ ￿ are the equilibrium prices of Arrow securities, H￿ ￿
is the equilibrium law of motion for the aggregate state of the economy, and the maximization is over
the scalars n and kv. Note that the decision rule for capital that corresponds to the solution of this
Bellman equation is of the (S,s) variety. footnote  It is characterized by a pair of lower and upper
capital thresholds a￿s￿, A￿s￿ such that:
kv = a￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k < a￿s￿
= A￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k > A￿s￿
= ￿1 ? N￿k, otherwise
    
where the dependence of a￿s￿ and A￿s￿ on the aggregate state of the economy has been suppressed to
simplify notation (Figure 1 shows a picture of this decision rule). Note that there is a pair of lower and
upper threshold ￿a￿s￿,A￿s￿￿ for every possible idiosyncratic productivity shock s. Hereon we will
denote ￿a,A￿ as being the vector ￿a￿s￿,A￿s￿￿s=1,V across idiosyncratic shocks.
Our strategy will be to keep track of long histories of ￿a,A￿ as state variables instead of the actual
distributions x and y, and use them to construct approximate distributions for x and y using the law of
motion ( ref: main motion x ). footnote  In principle, as we make the length of the history of ￿a,A￿
arbitrarily large we would obtain an arbitrarily good approximation for x and y. An important question
will be how large to make this length in practice (I will return to this question below). Our solution
method will require solving independently for the deterministic steady state of the economy. Appendix
A describes how this is performed.
Let ￿a,A￿ denote the history of thresholds Æat,At￿t=1,...,T, for some large horizon T, where ￿at,At￿
correspond to the thresholds chosen t periods ago. Also, let ￿ac,Ac￿ be the thresholds corresponding to
the current period. Since we know that the optimal decision rules of establishments are of the (S,s)
variety, there is no loss of generality in defining the Social Planner’s problem directly in terms of
choosing the current thresholds ￿ac,Ac￿ and the fraction of people that work R as follows: footnote V￿a,A,z￿ = MAX ln c￿a,A,z,ac,Ac,R￿ ? J R + KEV￿av,Av,zv￿     
subject to:
at+1
v ￿s￿ = at￿s￿, for t = 1,2,...,T ? 1 and s = 1,V
a1
v ￿s￿ = ac￿s￿, for s = 1,V
At+1
v ￿s￿ = At￿s￿, for t = 1,2,...,T ? 1 and s = 1,V
A1
v ￿s￿ = Ac￿s￿, for s = 1,V
zv = _z + Pv
    
    
where equations ( ref: update a ) update tomorrow’s histories given the current threshold choices.
The function c￿a,A,z,ac,Ac,R￿ gives the maximum consumption that can be obtained given the
history of thresholds ￿a,A￿, the current aggregate productivity shock z, the current choices of
thresholds ￿ac,Ac￿, and the decision of how many agents to currently put to work R. Formally,
c￿a,A,z,ac,Ac,R￿ is given by the following static labor allocation problem:
c￿a,A,z,ac,Ac,R￿ = MAXX Æ ezs kSn￿k,s￿
L
? ￿g￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ Q￿g￿k,s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ ￿ dx +X￿1 ? N￿ d￿k,s￿ q ^￿s,0￿ dy
    
subject to:
Xn￿k,s￿ dx † R     
where the maximization is with respect to the function n￿k,s￿.
The functions g, x, d, and y in ( ref: c() ) and ( ref: n() ) are determined by ￿a,A,z,ac,Ac￿ in the
following way:
(i) The current investment decision rule g is implied by the current thresholds ￿ac,Ac￿:
g￿k,s￿ = ac￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k < ac￿s￿
= Ac￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k > Ac￿s￿
= ￿1 ? N￿k, otherwise
    
(ii) The current measure across establishment types x is obtained by initializing this measure T
periods ago (xT) to be the deterministic steady state measure xD, and updating it recursively by
iterating on the law of motion:
xt?1￿B,sv￿ =
￿k,s￿: gt￿k,s￿5B
X ^￿s,sv￿ dxt + c f￿sv￿ e￿0 5 B￿     
for t = T,T ? 1,...,1. The (approximate) measure x is then given by x0.
The investment decision rules (gt) t periods ago (for t = T,T ? 1,...,1), which are used in this law
of motion are the ones determined by the corresponding thresholds ￿at,At￿ in the history ￿a,A￿:
gt￿k,s￿ = at￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k < at￿s￿
= At￿s￿, if ￿1 ? N￿k > At￿s￿
= ￿1 ? N￿k, otherwise
    
(iii) The previous period measure across establishment types y, and the previous period decisions
over current capital levels across establishment types d are those returned as x1 and g1 in (ii).
Note that the Social Planner’s problem in equation ( ref: SP* ) has linear constraints, and that the
deterministic steady state values for the (endogenous) state variables are all strictly positive. We canthen perform a quadratic approximation to the return function about the deterministic steady state,
leaving us with a standard linear quadratic (L-Q) problem which can be solved by ordinary value
function iteration. footnote 
Let us now return to the question of how long the history of thresholds ￿a,A￿ should be to get a
good approximate solution to the original problem ( ref: SP ). It is not difficult to show that there exists
a length J for thresholds histories such that solving by L-Q methods the planner’s problem ( ref: SP* )
corresponding to length J, gives exactly the same solution as solving by L-Q methods the planner’s
problem ( ref: SP* ) corresponding to any other length T > J (Appendix B explains the intuition for
this result). footnote  It follows that the only approximation error introduced by the solution method
stems from the quadratic approximation and not from keeping track of a finite history of thresholds.
Parametrization of the model
This section describes the steady state observations used to calibrate the parameters of the model
economy. In this section, the irreversibility parameter q will be assumed fixed at some particular value.
Given a fixed q, the rest of the parameters we need to calibrate are K,S,L,N,J,c,f￿1￿,V, the transition
matrix E, and the parameters determining the driving process for the aggregate productivity shock: _
and aP
2.
The first issue we must address is what actual measure of capital will our model capital correspond
to. Since we are interested in investment irreversibilities at the establishment level it seems natural to
abstract from capital components such as land, residential structures and consumer durables. The
empirical counterpart for capital was consequently identified with plant and equipment. As a result,
investment was associated in the National Income and Product Accounts with non-residential
investment. On the other hand, the empirical counterpart for consumption was identified with personal
consumption expenditures in non-durable goods and services. Output was then defined to be the sum
of these investment and consumption measures. The annual capital-output ratio and the
investment-output ratio corresponding to these measures are 1.7 and 0.15 respectively. The
depreciation rate N was selected to be consistent with these two magnitudes.
The annual interest rate was selected to be 4 per cent. This is a compromise between the average
real return on equity and the average real return on short-term debt for the period 1889 to 1978 as
reported by Mehra and Prescott  cite: mehra and prescott . The discount factor K was chosen to
generate this interest rate at steady state. Given the interest rate i and the depreciation rate N, the
parameter S was selected to match the capital-output ratio in the U.S. economy. The labor share
parameter was in turn selected to replicate a labor share in National Income of 0.64 (this is the
standard value used in the business cycle literature). On the other hand, the preference parameter J
was picked such that 80% of the population works at steady state (roughly the fraction of the U.S.
working age population that is employed).
The transition matrix E was chosen to be of the following form:
1 0 0
Q d￿1 ? Q￿ ￿1 ? d￿￿1 ? Q￿
Q ￿1 ? d￿￿1 ? Q￿ d￿1 ? Q￿
    
i.e. a process that treats the low and the high productivity shocks symmetrically. The rest of the
parameters to calibrate are then d,Q,c,f￿1￿, and V. The parameters Q,d, and V were selected to
reproduce important observations on job creation and job destruction reported in Davis and
Haltiwanger  cite: davis and haltiwanger . These are: (i) that the average annual job creation rate due to
births and the average annual job destruction rate due to deaths are both about 2.35%, (ii) that the
average annual job creation rate due to continuing establishments and the average annual jobdestruction rate due to continuing establishments are both about 7.9%, and (iii) that about 82.3% of the
jobs destroyed during a year are still destroyed the following year. The parameter X determining the
number of establishments being created every period was chosen so that the average establishment size
in the model economy is about 65 employees, same magnitude as in the data.
Next, we must determine the distribution f over initial productivity shocks. If we would allow for
a large number of possible idiosyncratic productivity shocks, it would be natural to chose a f to
reproduce the same size distribution of establishments as in the data. footnote  With only two values
for the idiosyncratic shocks this approach does not seem restrictive enough since we can pick any two
arbitrary employment ranges in the actual size distribution to calibrate to. For this reason I chose to
follow the same principle as in the choice of E and pick f = ￿0.5,0.5￿, i.e. a distribution that treats the
low and the high productivity shock symmetrically (note that these choices of E and f imply that at
steady state there will be as many establishments with the low shock as with the high shock).
Finally, we must determine values for _ and aP
2. The strategy for selecting values for these
parameters was to chose them so that measured Solow residuals in the model economy replicate the
behavior of measured Solow residuals in the data. Proportionate changes in measured Solow residual
are defined as the proportionate change in aggregate output minus the sum of the proportionate change
in labor times the labor share L, minus the sum of the proportionate change in capital times ￿1 ? L￿.
Note that these changes in measured Solow residuals do not coincide with changes in the aggregate
productivity variable z in the model (the aggregate production function in the model economy is not a
constant returns Cobb-Douglas function in labor and aggregate capital). Using the measure of output
described above and a share of labor of 0.64, measured Solow residuals were found to be as highly
persistent as in Prescott  cite: prescott  but the standard deviation of technology changes came up
somewhat smaller: 0.0063 instead of the usual 0.0076 value used in the literature. Given a fixed
irreversibility parameter q and the rest of the parameters calibrated as above, values for _ and aP
2 were
selected so that measured Solow residuals in the model economy displayed similar persistence and
variability as in the data. It happened to be the case that values of _ = 0.95 and aP
2 = 0.00632 were
consistent with these observations in all the experiments reported below.
Parameters values corresponding to economies with several different possible values for q are
reported in Table 1.
Benchmark aggregate fluctuations
There is considerable uncertainty about the choice of an empirically plausible value for the
irreversibility parameter q. Even though a number of empirical papers have documented features of
establishment behavior that suggest the presence of investment irreversibilities at the establishment
level (e.g. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger  cite: caballero engel haltiwanger , Doms and Dunne
 cite: doms and dunne ), almost no attempt was made to estimate the magnitude of the irreversibilities
that establishments face. A remarkable exception is Ramey and Shapiro  cite: ramey and shapiro .
Using data on the equipment auction of an aerospace firm, they estimated the wedge between the
purchase price and the resale price for different types of capital. Specifically, they estimated that
wedge to be 31% for machine tools and 5% for structural equipment. A difficulty with their estimates
is that they correspond to a single firm and cannot be directly extended to the whole economy. In any
case, they are indicative of important degrees of investment irreversibilities at the micro level. As a
consequence, the economy with q = 0.5 will be selected as a benchmark case but later on results will
be reported under a variety of values for the irreversibility parameter q.
Table 2 reports summary statistics (standard deviations and correlations with output) for the
aggregate fluctuations of the benchmark economy and compares them to those of the actual U.S.
economy. Before any statistics were computed, all time series were logged and detrended using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The statistics reported for the U.S. economy correspond to the output,investment and consumption measures described in the previous section, and refer to the period
between 1960:3 and 1993:4. For the artificial economy, time series of length 136 periods (same as in
the data) were computed for 100 simulations, the reported statistics being averages across these
simulations.
We observe that output fluctuates as much in the model economy as in actual data. Investment is
about 5 times more variable than output in the model while it is about 4 times as variable in the U.S.
economy. Consumption is less variable than output in both economies (though consumption is less
variable in the model than in U.S. data). The aggregate stock of capital varies about the same in both
economies. On the other hand, hours variability is only 70% the variability of output in the model
economy while they vary as much as output in U.S. data. Productivity fluctuates less in the model
economy than in the actual economy. In terms of correlations with output, we see that almost all
variables are highly procyclical both in the model and in U.S. data. The only exceptions are capital
(which is acyclical both in the model and the actual economy) and productivity (which is highly
procyclical in the model while it is acyclical in the data).
We conclude that the benchmark economy is broadly consistent with salient features of U.S.
business cycles.
Microeconomic irreversibilities and aggregate dynamics
In a celebrated paper Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger  cite: caballero engel haltiwanger  analyzed
the importance of microeconomic irreversibilities for macroeconomic dynamics using a non-structural
empirical approach. They concluded that irreversibilities play a crucial role in generating brisk
expansions and contractions in aggregate investment dynamics. Since this has become the dominant
view thereafter, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 will describe their approach in detail and apply it to the
benchmark economy. The objective is not only to facilitate comparisons with the previous literature,
but to demonstrate the need for a general equilibrium analysis.
Section 6.3 constitutes the core of the paper. It compares the equilibrium business cycles of
economies subject to different degrees of investment irreversibilities. Contrary to what the
Caballero-Engel-Haltiwanger analysis of Section 6.2 suggests, investment irreversibilities are found to
have no effects on aggregate business cycle dynamics.
The ”Caballero-Engel-Haltiwanger” approach
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (hereafter CEH) proposed the following non-structural method
of analysis. footnote  They defined ”desired capital” kt+1
d to be the stock of capital an establishment
would like to carry to the following period if its investment irreversibility constraint was momentarily
removed during the current period. Correspondingly, they defined ”mandated investment” et to be:
et = kt+1
d ? ￿1 ? N￿kt     
where kt is the establishment’s stock of capital at date t, and N is the depreciation rate of capital.
CEH assumed that the investment behavior of establishments could be described by a ”hazard
function” H￿e￿, which specifies for each possible e the fraction of its mandated investment that an
establishment actually undertakes. Letting ft be the distribution of establishments across mandated
investments at date t, aggregate investment It is given by:
It = Xe H ￿e￿ ft￿e￿ de     
To empirically implement their model, CEH first had to estimate the desired stock of capital kt+1
d
for each establishment and time-period in their sample. footnote  This gave CEH an empirical time
series for the distribution of cross-sectional mandated investment ft. A functional form for the hazard
function H also had to be specified. CEH chose to work with the following polynomial form:H￿e￿ =
V
v=0
> jv ev     






v+1     
where Mt
v is the v-th moment of the distribution of mandated investments ft.
CEH noticed that when establishments face quadratic costs of adjustment, their optimal investment
behavior is described by a constant hazard function. In this case the ”linear” model results: aggregate
investment depends only on the first moment of the distribution of mandated investment (V = 0 in
equations  ref: hazard  and  ref: quasi regress ). In all other ”non-linear” cases, higher moments of the
distribution can play an important role in accounting for aggregate investment behavior.
Allowing for a constant, ( ref: quasi regress ) gives rise to the CEH regression equation:




v+1 + Pt     
Using the first five moments of their estimated cross-sectional distribution of mandated investment,
CEH fitted this equation to aggregate investment data using ordinary least squares. They found that the
hazard function implied by their estimated coefficients j is highly non-linear. It indicates that
establishments undertake small adjustments in response to negative mandated investments and that
they respond substantially to positive mandated investments (a behavior consistent with irreversibilities
in investment). footnote  This finding is extremely important, it suggests that microeconomic
irreversibilities exist in the U.S. economy and that the associated non-linear adjustments at the
establishment level are consistent with aggregate investment dynamics.
To evaluate the importance of non-linear adjustments for aggregate investment dynamics CEH ran
a second regression, this time constraining aggregate investment to depend only on the first moment of
the cross-sectional distribution of mandated investments (i.e. setting V to zero in equation
 ref: regress ). CEH considered this linear model to be of particular interest since it corresponds to an
economy with quadratic costs of adjustment. CEH believed that comparing the aggregate investment
behavior predicted by this linear model with the predictions of the non-linear model would determine
the role played by microeconomic irreversibilities in aggregate investment dynamics.
Analyzing the relative performance of both models, CEH found the following results: 1) the
non-linear model kept track of aggregate investment behavior much better than the linear model (the
absolute values of the prediction errors were always larger in the linear model than in the non-linear
model), and 2) this was specially true at brisk expansions and contractions (the difference between the
absolute prediction error of the linear model and the absolute prediction error of the non-linear model
was larger at periods when aggregate investment was far from its mean). CEH interpreted these results
as evidence that microeconomic irreversibilities are crucial for macroeconomic dynamics. In particular,
that irreversibilities play an important role in generating brisk expansions and contractions in aggregate
investment.
This way of evaluating the importance of microeconomic irreversibilities for aggregate dynamics
presents a serious weakness. The analysis compares the predictions made by the linear model with the
predictions made by the non-linear model, conditional on a same realization of cross-sectional
distributions of mandated investments ft. However, mandated investments are not invariant to the
investment technology that establishments face. If microeconomic irreversibilities were replaced byquadratic costs of adjustment, mandated investments would no longer be the same. As a result, U.S.
mandated investments (which were determined to correspond to an economy with investment
irreversibilities) cannot be used to evaluate how aggregate investment would behave if establishments
faced quadratic costs of adjustment. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate that this type of analysis can in
fact lead to the wrong answers.
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger visit the benchmark model
This section applies the CEH analysis to the benchmark economy. The objective is twofold. First,
to explore wether the benchmark economy is broadly consistent with the CEH empirical findings.
Second, to determine what conclusions can be obtained about the importance of investment
irreversibilities for aggregate dynamics.
Applying the CEH approach will involve running a similar set of regressions as CEH, but on
artificial data generated by the benchmark economy. Before doing so, model-counterparts for the
variables defined by CEH must be determined.
Observe that the desired capital of an establishment of type ￿k,s￿ is given by kt+1
d = a￿s￿, since this
is the stock of capital the establishment would chose if q was set to one during the current period (see
footnote 7). As a consequence, its mandated investment is given by e = a￿s￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k. The aggregate
measure xt of establishments across idiosyncratic productivity shocks s and capital levels k can then be
used to obtain the cumulative distribution of establishments across mandated investments levels in the
model economy: footnote 
Ft￿e￿ =
￿k,s￿: a￿s￿?￿1?N￿k † e and k>0
X dxt
The moments Mt
v to be used in the regressions below are those obtained from this cumulative
distribution. footnote 
To generate artificial data, the empirical realization of Solow residuals for the period 1960:1 to
1993:4 was fed into the model economy. footnote  The resulting time series for aggregate investment
and the first five moments Mt
v were subsequently used to estimate the CEH investment equation
( ref: regress ) by ordinary least squares. The estimated coefficients gave rise to the hazard function
shown in Figure 2. footnote  This hazard function displays similar properties as those reported by
CEH, i.e. it indicates small adjustments to capital surpluses and large adjustments to capital shortages.
This is not surprising since there are substantial investment irreversibilities in the benchmark model
economy and consequently, establishments do follow (S,s) decision rules. footnote 
Following CEH, the linear model was also estimated. In particular, a second regression allowing
aggregate investment to depend only on the first moment of the distribution of mandated investments
was fitted to the model-generated data.
Before comparing the predictions of the two statistical models, the time periods from the
simulations were sorted in a decreasing order from the largest to the smallest realized absolute
deviation of aggregate investment from its mean. Figure 3 plots the difference between the absolute
prediction error of the linear model and the absolute prediction error of the nonlinear model, across the
sorted time periods. footnote  We observe two important patterns. First, in all periods the difference is
positive. Second, the difference is large in the first few periods and then declines towards zero. In other
words, the non-linear model predicts the benchmark economy’s aggregate investment more accurately
and this is specially true when aggregate investment is far from its mean. footnote  These are exactly
the same findings that CEH encountered in their empirical analysis. We see that the benchmark
economy conforms with them quite well.
Based on similar findings, CEH concluded that microeconomic irreversibilities play a crucial role
in generating brisk expansions and contractions in aggregate investment. However, the analysisperformed provides little economic support for making such type of assessment. While the predictions
of the estimated non-linear model (approximately) describe the behavior of aggregate investment in our
benchmark economy, it is not clear what investment behavior the estimated linear model is
capturing. footnote  In principle, it represents some economy with quadratic costs of adjustment. But it
would be hard to determine an economy consistent both with the constant hazard function of our
estimated linear model and the mandated investments of our benchmark economy. footnote  Even if
such economy exists, comparing its aggregate investment dynamics with that of our benchmark
economy (as the CEH approach does) is probably not a fruitful exercise: the economies would differ in
so many dimensions, that no definite statement could be made about the particular role of
microeconomic irreversibilities in aggregate dynamics. footnote 
Given these difficulties with the CEH approach, Section 6.3 will perform an alternative analysis. It
will compare the general equilibrium dynamics of economies subject to different investment
irreversibility levels. An important advantage of this approach is that explicit economic environments
will be specified and that the aggregate dynamics analyzed will be fully consistent with these
environments. As a consequence, the analysis will be able to make precise statements about the role of
investment irreversibilities in aggregate dynamics. Interestingly, the conclusions obtained will be in
sharp contrast to CEH.
The effects of micro-irreversibilities in aggregate fluctuations
This section evaluates the effects of irreversibilities on aggregate fluctuations by comparing the
equilibrium business cycles of economies subject to different degrees of investment irreversibilities.
For this to be a meaningful exercise, the economies must be comparable in important dimensions. We
choose them to be identical to the U.S. economy in terms of the long run means and ratios of Section 4,
as well as their stochastic processes for measured solow residuals. These are all observations that the
real business cycle literature has emphasized as being important for aggregate fluctuations. Controlling
for them will help isolate the effects of investment irreversibilities in business cycle dynamics.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the business cycles of economies with investment
irreversibility parameters q’s ranging between 1 and 0. footnote  The results are striking.
Irreversibilities tend to decrease the variability of output, investment and hours, and increase the
variability of consumption. But these differences are surprisingly small. For example, the standard
deviation of output decreases monotonically as q goes from 1 to 0 (as one would expect given the
adjustment costs introduced), but it goes from 1.41 when q = 1 to only 1.39 when q = 0. This is a small
difference considering that we are moving from the perfectly reversible case to the complete
irreversibilities scenario. Overall, the properties of the business cycles generated by all these
economies are extremely similar. We conclude that, at least in terms of the standard statistics that the
real business cycle literature focuses on, investment irreversibilities play no crucial role for aggregate
fluctuations.
Nevertheless, investment irreversibilities could still be important for features of the business cycles
not captured by the standard RBC statistics. One possibility is that investment irreversibilities generate
brisker expansions and contractions in aggregate investment. Another possibility is that investment
irreversibilities create asymmetries in aggregate fluctuations. Figure 4 explores these possibilities: it
reports for the economies with q = 1 and q = 0, the histograms of the deviations of aggregate
investment from trend across all realizations. If investment irreversibilities generate brisker expansions
or contractions, the histogram under q = 0 would have fatter tails than under q = 1. On the other hand,
if investment irreversibilities generate asymmetries, the histogram under q = 0 would be more
asymmetric than under q = 1. However, Figure 4 shows that these histograms are virtually the same.
Investment irreversibilities do not create noticeable asymmetries nor brisk expansions and
contractions. footnote Figure 5 searches for other possible differences in aggregate dynamics created by investment
irreversibilities. It reports the realizations of aggregate investment which arise from feeding into the
economies with q = 1 and q = 0 the empirical realization of Solow residuals for the period 1960:1 to
1993:4. We observe that the time series for aggregate investment generated by the economy with
complete irreversibilities is almost identical to the one generated by the economy with perfectly
reversible investment. Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions for output (Y), consumption (c),
investment (I), and labor (R) to a one-time aggregate productivity shock of one standard deviation,
which correspond to the economies with q = 1 and q = 0. We also see that they are almost the same.
We conclude that investment irreversibilities have no major effects on aggregate business cycle
dynamics.
This is a surprising result. Intuition suggests that investment irreversibilities could generate
important asymmetries in aggregate fluctuations, as establishments would be much more reluctant to
adjust their stock of capital to negative productivity shocks than to positive productivity shocks. To
understand our lack of asymmetries result, we must analyze the responses of the model economy to
aggregate shocks in further detail.
For the economy with q = 0.99, Figure 7 shows the impulse response of the capital support of the
distribution xt to a one-time aggregate productivity shock of one standard deviation, starting from the
steady state support (the steady state capital distribution xD is displayed in Figure 8). footnote  We see
that in response to a positive shock, the thresholds a￿1￿, A￿1￿ and a￿V￿ increase on impact, continue to
increase for a number of periods and eventually decrease, returning gradually to their steady state
levels. Instead, the capital levels pertaining to the range of inaction between a￿1￿ and A￿1￿ are not
affected on impact. They follow the same dynamics as the upper threshold A￿1￿ but with a lag, which
depends on the number of periods it takes A￿1￿ to depreciate to the corresponding capital level.
Observe that the support of the capital distribution responds symmetrically to positive and negative
shocks. It is then not surprising that the business cycles generated by these shocks will inherit similar
features. footnote 
On a first impression, the symmetric response of the capital support to aggregate shocks may
appear a necessary consequence of the linear quadratic approximation performed. But this is not
generally true. The solution method implies that current capital thresholds (the decision variables) are a
linear function of the aggregate shock and the past history of capital thresholds (the state variables). If
the driving aggregate productivity shock is symmetrically distributed, of course capital thresholds will
behave symmetrically. But this does not imply that the capital support will behave symmetrically. In
fact, it seems safe to conjecture that the symmetry would be lost if aggregate shocks had an empirically
implausible large variance.
To be concrete, let consider how the largest point in the capital support would respond to a large
negative shock, starting from its steady state value aD￿V￿. Suppose that the shock is so low that the
threshold a￿V￿ decreases on impact below ￿1 ? N￿aD￿V￿. The highest point in the support would then
become ￿1 ? N￿aD￿V￿, since it would fall in the range of inaction defined by the new value of a￿V￿.
What is important to note is that negative shocks of larger magnitude would generate no further effects
on impact, since ￿1 ? N￿aD￿V￿ would still fall in a range of inaction. On the contrary, there would be no
counterpart to this lack of further responsiveness when shocks are positive. If a positive shock drives
a￿V￿ above ￿1 ? N￿aD￿V￿, the highest point in the support would always jump on impact to the new
value of a￿V￿. This would be true no matter how large the positive shock is.
Figure 9 illustrates these ideas by showing the impulse responses of the highest point in the capital
support to one-time aggregate shocks, ranging from one to twenty standard deviations in
magnitude. footnote  Let consider the responses in period one to each of these shocks. We see that
when shocks are negative, the largest capital level in the support moves to smaller values as the shock
becomes larger. However, once the shock reaches fifteen standard deviations, it stops responding tofurther shocks. On the contrary, when shocks are positive, this capital level always moves to higher
values as the shock gets larger. This pattern of response opens interesting possibilities for the creation
of asymmetries in aggregate fluctuations. In particular, it suggests that aggregate investment would
tend to decrease slowly in response to large negative shocks, and increase sharply in response to large
positive shocks. footnote 
In view of these arguments, we must consider the lack of asymmetries the theory predicts as
arising purely from measurement. Measured solow residuals are not variable enough for investment
irreversibilities to create asymmetries in aggregate business cycles: the associated fluctuations in
capital thresholds are small compared with the drift introduced by depreciation (actually in none of the
simulations reported, the rate of change of thresholds ever exceeded the rate of depreciation). footnote 
To complete our analysis, we now consider the importance of irreversibilities for plant level
investment dynamics. Figure 10 shows the distribution of plant level gross investment rates (for
continuing establishments) across all realizations, under different values for the irreversibility
parameter q. footnote  We observe that when there are no irreversibilities (q = 1.0), a large number of
establishments have near-zero net investment (gross investment approximately equals the depreciation
of capital). footnote  We also observe that a small number of firms make sharp increases and sharp
decreases in their stock of capital. footnote  On the contrary, when the irreversibility parameter q
becomes zero: 1) the number of establishments displaying close-to-zero adjustment is larger, 2) there
are no establishments with sizable negative investment rates, and 3) capital increases are not as sharp
as under q = 1.0. Note that a substantial mass of establishments have zero gross investment, since a
large number of plants chose to remain inactive because of the investment irreversibility they face (they
lie in ranges of inaction). It is also interesting to note that the histogram of investment rates that arises
when q = 0.95 is very similar to the one under q = 0. This conforms with the finding by Abel and
Eberly  cite: abel and eberly  that small degrees of irreversibilities can matter a lot. Figure 10 shows
that even though irreversibilities play no important role for aggregate fluctuations, they are crucial for
establishment level dynamics.
Conclusions
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger  cite: caballero engel haltiwanger  found that non-linear
adjustments are crucial for aggregating mandated investments in the U.S. economy into observed
aggregate investment dynamics. While their findings represent substantial evidence of investment
irreversibilities in the U.S. economy, their analysis is less useful for assessing the importance of
investment irreversibilities in business cycle dynamics. To evaluate the effects of investment
irreversibilities on aggregate fluctuations, the business cycles of economies subject to different levels
of irreversibilities must be analyzed.
An interesting empirical project would be to study how business cycles vary with investment
irreversibilities across actual countries, after controlling for variables such as average capital-output
ratios, capital shares, investment rates, variability and persistence of solow residuals, etc (i.e. variables
that business cycle theory emphasize as being important). However, lack of data on investment
irreversibilities makes this exercise unfeasible.
This paper has used economic theory to proxy for this exercise. It has compared the business
cycles of artificial economies that look exactly the same as the U.S. economy in terms of their long run
observations and solow residuals, but which differ in terms of their investment irreversibility levels.
The results were striking: economies ranging from fully reversible to completely irreversible
investment generate almost identical business cycle dynamics. The only dimension in which investment
irreversibilities matter is for establishment level dynamics.
Our results suggest that macroeconomists can safely abstract from investment irreversibilities
when modeling aggregate business cycle dynamics. appendix 
Appendix
This appendix describes the algorithm used to compute the steady state of the deterministic version
of the economy. We will show that the problem is reduced to solving one equation in one unknown
(after the relevant substitutions have been made). First, it must be noticed that (similarly to the
neoclassical growth model) the steady state interest rate is given by:
1 + i = 1
K     
Fixing the wage rate at an arbitrary value w, the value of the different types of establishments (as a
function of w) can be obtained by solving the following functional equation:




> J￿kv,sv;w￿^￿s,sv￿ ￿     
The solution to this problem is computed using standard recursive methods. Note that the solution to
this problem also gives the decision rules n￿k,s;w￿ and g￿k,s;w￿ as a function of w.
Given a w and the corresponding g￿k,s;w￿, a measure x￿w￿ across productivity shocks and capital
levels can be obtained from the law of motion for x:
x￿B,sv;w￿ =
￿k,s￿:g￿k,s;w￿5B
X ^￿s,sv￿ dx￿w￿ + c f￿sv￿ e￿0 5 B￿     
In practice, this is solved by iterating on this law of motion starting from an arbitrary initial guess
for x￿w￿.
Once a x￿w￿ is obtained and given the previous n￿k,s;w￿ and g￿k,s;w￿ found, we can solve for the
corresponding consumption c￿w￿ implied by the feasibility condition:
c￿w￿ = X s kSn￿k,s;w￿
L ? ￿g￿k,s;w￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ Q￿g￿k,s;w￿ ? ￿1 ? N￿k￿ dx￿w￿
+ X ￿1 ? N￿ g￿k,s;w￿ q ^￿s,0￿ dx￿w￿     
A wage rate w corresponds to the steady state value if the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure is satisfied, i.e.:
c￿w￿ = w
J     
This is one equation in one unknown and is solved using standard root finding methods.
The actual computer implementation of this algorithm requires working with a finite grid of capital
levels. In all experiments reported in the paper, the number of grid points were between 1,000 and
1,800.
Appendix
This appendix provides intuition for why it is sufficient to carry a finite history of thresholds when
solving the social planner’s problem ( ref: SP* ) by L-Q methods.
Suppose that it takes exactly J periods for the steady state upper threshold AD￿1￿ to first depreciate
below the steady state lower threshold aD￿1￿. For simplicity, assume that AD￿1￿ < aD￿V￿. Fixing all
other thresholds at their steady state values, consider for example the effects of a small change in the
upper capital threshold A￿1￿ about its steady state value AD￿1￿. In what follows it will be argued that
within J periods, an establishments that was affected by this small change in A￿1￿ will end up with
exactly the same capital level as in the absence of such small perturbation.
There are two possibilities. The first case is if after exactly J periods the establishment has not yet
made a transition to s = V. In this case, its stock of capital (after J periods) would be given by￿1 ? N￿
JA￿1￿ (since the establishment would have stayed in the range of inaction corresponding to
s = 1). Given that A￿1￿ is close to AD￿1￿, and ￿1 ? N￿
JAD￿1￿ < aD￿1￿, it follows from
( ref: inv. decisions ) that (after J periods) the establishment will chose its next period capital to be
kv = aD￿1￿ (the same kv the establishment would have chosen without the small perturbation in A￿1￿).
The second case is if the establishment makes a transition to s = V in t periods, where t < J. In this
case, its capital level would be ￿1 ? N￿
tA￿1￿ at the time of such transition. Since A￿1￿ is close to AD￿1￿
and ￿1 ? N￿
tAD￿1￿ < aD￿V￿, it follows from ( ref: inv. decisions ) that the establishment will chose a
next period stock of capital kv = aD￿V￿ at the time of the transition (again, the same kv the
establishment would have chosen without the small perturbation in A￿1￿).
Note that if a￿1￿ or a￿V￿ would’ve differed slightly from their steady state values at the time that
these actions take place, the argument would still apply. The establishment would end up within J
periods with a stock of capital given by a threshold level determined in a later period, independently of
the small perturbation in A￿1￿ made J periods ago. As a consequence no further information is gained
from keeping histories more than J periods long, provided that capital thresholds remain in a
neighborhood of their steady state values. footnote 
abel and eberly Abel, A. and Eberly, J. 1996. Optimal Investment with Costly Reversibility. Review of
Economic Studies, 63, 581-93.
arrow Arrow, K. 1968. Optimal Capital Policy with Irreversible Investment’ in Value, Capital and
Growth, Papers in honour of Sir John Hicks, J. N. Wolfe (es.), Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company.
bertola caballero 1990 Bertola, G. and Caballero, R. 1990. Kinked Adjustment Costs and Aggregate Dynamics.
NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
bertola caballero 1994 Bertola, G. and Caballero, R. 1994. Irreversibility and Aggregate Investment. Review of
Economic Studies, 61, 223-246.
caballero engel 2 Caballero, R. and Engel, E. 1991. Dynamic (S,s) Economies. Econometrica, 59-6, 1659-1686.
caballero and engel Caballero, R. and Engel, E. 1994. Explaining Investment Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing:
A Generalized (S,s) Approach. NBER Working Paper # 4887.
caballero engel haltiwanger Caballero, R. , Engel, E. and Haltiwanger, J. 1995. Plant Level Adjustment and
Aggregate Investment Dynamics. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1995.
caballero engel haltiwanger 2 Caballero, R. , Engel, E. and Haltiwanger, J. 1997. Aggregate Employment
Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence. American Economic Review, 87-1,
115-137.
caplin and leahy Caplin, A. and Leahy, J. 1997. Aggregation and Optimization with State-Dependent Pricing.
Econometrica, 65-3, 601-625.
davis and haltiwanger Davis, S. and Haltiwanger, J. 1990. Gross Job Creation and Destruction: Microeconomic
Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, V, 123- 168.
dixit and pindyck Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
doms and dunne Doms, M. and Dunne, T. 1993. Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manufacturing Plants. Center
for Economic Studies, mimeo.
dotsey king and wolman Dotsey, King and Wolman. 1996. State Dependent Pricing and the General
Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output. Mimeo.
dow and olson Dow, J. and Olson, L. 1992. Irreversibility and the behavior of aggregate stochastic growth
models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16, 207-223.
fisher and hornstein Fisher, J. and Hornstein, A. 1995. (S,s) Inventory Policies in General Equilibrium. Mimeo,
University of Western Ontario.
kydland and prescott Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. 1982. Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.
Econometrica, 50, 1345-1370.hansen Hansen, G. 1985. Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics, 16,
309-327.
mehra and prescott Mehra, R. and Prescott, E. 1985. The Equity Premium: A Puzzle. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 15, 145-161.
olson Olson, L. 1989. Stochastic Growth with Irreversible Investment. Journal of Economic Theory, 47,
101-129.
prescott Prescott, E. 1986. Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement. Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis. Quarterly Review.
ramey and shapiro Ramey, V. and Shapiro, M. 1996. Sectoral Mobility of Capital: A Case Study of an
Aerospace Firm. Mimeo.
rogerson Rogerson, R. 1988. Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics,
21, 3-16.
sargent Sargent, T. 1980. ”Tobin’s q” and the Rate of Investment in General Equilibrium.
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 12, 107-154.
thomas Thomas, J. 1997. Lumpy Investment, Partial Adjustment and the Business Cycle: A
Reconciliation. Mimeo, University of Virginia.
veracierto Veracierto, M. 1997. Plant Level Irreversible Investment and Equilibrium Business Cycles.




q = 1.0 q = 0.99 q = 0.95 q = 0.90 q = 0.75 q = 0.50 q = 0.00
ß 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
? 0.2186 0.2185 0.2179 0.2174 0.2173 0.2172 0.2168
? 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
d 0.02206 0.02184 0.02163 0.02146 0.02066 0.01914 0.01622
a 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
? 7.257E-5 7.260E-5 7.257E-5 7.273E-5 7.278E-5 7.280E-5 7.287E-5
?(1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
? 1.112 1.127 1.195 1.208 1.210 1.213 1.220
f 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
? 0.00593 0.00593 0.00593 0.00593 0.00593 0.00593 0.00593
? 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
sg
2 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063 0.0063
2 2 2 2 2 2 243
TABLE 2
U.S. and benchmark fluctuations
U.S. Economy (60:1-93:4) Benchmark Economy
Std. Deviation Correlation Std. Deviation Correlation
Output  1.33 1.00 1.39 1.00
Consumption 0.87 0.91 0.51 0.91
Investment 4.99 0.91 6.83 0.98
Capital 0.63 0.04 0.49 0.08
Hours 1.42 0.85 0.94 0.98
Productivity 0.76 -0.16 0.51 0.9244
TABLE 3
Business cycles across economies
Standard Deviations:
q = 1.0 q = 0.99 q = 0.95 q = 0.90 q = 0.75 q = 0.50 q = 0.00
Output 1.41 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39
Cons. 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52
Investm. 7.09 7.01 6.89 6.85 6.83 6.83 6.82
Capital 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48
Hours 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Product. 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52
Correlations with Output:
q = 1.0 q = 0.99 q = 0.95 q = 0.90 q = 0.75 q = 0.50 q = 0.00
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cons. 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Investm. 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Capital 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Hours 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
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Impulse Responses - Highest Point in Support 
            Negative Shock





































































































































































































Establishment Level Investment Rates
(q=1.0)
(q=.95)
(q=.00)